




First aim of this paper is to show that Evidentialism, when paired with a Psychologistic 
ontology of evidence, is unable to account for ordinary cases of inferential justification. 
As many epistemologists have maintained, however, when it is paired with a 
Propositionalist ontology of evidence, Evidentialism is unable to explain in a satisfactory 
way ordinary cases of perceptual justification. So, the Evidentialist is faced with a 
dilemma. Second aim of this paper is to give an argument in favour of Propositionalism 
about evidence, and so to motivate the conclusion that perceptual justification must be 
accounted for in non-evidentialist terms. By this I do not mean to defend a strongly Non-
Evidentialist epistemology, according to which there are doxastic attitudes which are 
unsupported by any justifier. More modestly, I aim to motivate the weakly Non-
Evidentialist epistemology according to which a subject’s perceptual beliefs may be 
justified by non-evidential justifiers. I conclude the paper by explaining why I believe that 
Pryor's dogmatism supplies a model for the way in which an internalist who is persuaded 






Evidentialism about epistemic justification is the view, or family of views, according 
to which whether a belief that P is justified for a subject S at a time t just depends 
on the evidence that S possesses at t. Although a few epistemologists have 
contended that Evidentialism is compatible with externalist or hybrid conceptions 
of epistemic justification (Williamson 2000; Goldman 2011), the view under 
consideration is regarded by most of its proponents as an internalist view, or family 
of views, on epistemic justification (Conee and Feldman 2004; McCain 2014; 
Steup 2001). In this paper I shall set aside the question of whether the view under 
consideration is better understood as specifying an externalist or hybrid notion of 
justification, and shall programmatically align with the majority by treating 
2 
Evidentalism––thereby committing myself to assessing its success––as an 
internalist view.   
In the extant literature, the paradigm of an Evidentialist internalist theory on 
epistemic justification is probably the position defended under the banner of 
‘Evidentialism’ by E. Conee and R. Feldman (2004, 2008; see also McCain 2014). 
Although these authors have formulated their view by distilling several principles, 
the one that is most fit to convey their position is possibly this: 
 
EJ Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if 
and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t.  
(2004: 83) 
As Conee and Feldman are ready to admit (2004: 84)––and many 
commentators have repeatedly observed (Comesaña 2010: 572; Dougherty 2011: 
7 and 193; Rysiew 2011: 207; McCain 2014)––EJ cannot be taken to convey a 
specific theory of epistemic justification before one has taken a definite stance 
toward three distinct questions. The first question, Q1, asks under what conditions 
E is evidence for a given proposition P. The second question, Q2, asks what kind 
of thing E is supposed to be. The third question Q3, finally, asks what it takes for a 
subject S to have E. Depending on which answers to these questions one 
endorses, the acceptance of the general schema conveyed by EJ may commit one 
to a number of different Evidentialist theories about epistemic justification.  
In this paper I shall concentrate, in particular, on Q2. In so doing, I pursue a 
twofold goal. My first aim is to refine an argument that I have already developed in 
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two papers of mine (XXX, YYY). In accordance with this argument, the Evidentialist 
who addresses the task of answering Q2 in principled terms is faced with a 
dilemma. If she answers Q2 by endorsing a Propositionalist ontology of evidence, 
she is unable to account for ordinary cases of doxastic perceptual justification. If 
she answers Q2 by endorsing a Psychologist ontology of evidence, she is unable 
to account for ordinary cases of doxastic inferential justification. The second aim 
of this paper is to offer a new argument for the conclusion that the Evidentialist 
should endorse a Propositionalist ontology of evidence. This argument, if 
successful, imposes the conclusion that EJ must be read in terms of a 
Propositionalist ontology of evidence. So, given the above dilemma, it imposes the 
conclusion that the Evidentialist is unable to account for ordinary cases of doxastic 
perceptual justification. This argument has hence the broader significance that 
most ordinary cases of doxastic perceptual justification must be explained in non-
evidentialist terms.  
By drawing the above conclusion, I shall defend what I call Weak Non-
Evidentialism. In the way I propose to use this label, Weak Non-Evidentialism is 
the position to which one is committed if one denies the left-to-right conditional 
embedded within EJ; namely, if one contends that a subject S’s belief can be 
epistemically justified even if it is not supported (even if it doesn’t fit) S’s evidence. 
Weak Non-Evidentialism is to be contrasted with Strong Non-Evidentialism, which 
is the claim that a subject S’s belief can be epistemically justified even if there is 
nothing which justifies it. Certain forms of doxastic conservatism and C. Wright 
(2004)’s entitlement theory are versions of Strong Non-Evidentialism. Strong Non-
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Evidentialism entails Weak Non-Evidentialism, but is not equivalent to it. The 
version I shall defend, in particular, accepts the conditional according to which if 
S’s belief is epistemically justified, there is something which justifies it. It simply 
denies that what justifies a belief can always be regarded as part of S’s evidence. 
Weak Non-Evidentialism can be externalist or internalist, depending on the nature 
of the non-evidential justifiers it countenances. A. Goldman’s process reliabilism, 
which countenances the reliability of one’s belief-forming processes as a non-
evidential justifier, can be regarded as an externalist form of Weak Non-
Evidentialism. The final part of the paper is devoted to the task of showing that 
Pryor (2000)’s dogmatism can be regarded as an internalist form of Weak Non-
Evidentialism.   
 
§1 Ontology of Evidence and EJ 
In this section, I address the question of what constitutes evidence, and explore 
the consequences of two possible answers to this question for the project of 
systematically explaining epistemic justification in evidentialist terms. In particular, 
I shall concentrate on doxastic justification. So some preliminaries are needed 
before we move on, for EJ is a principle of propositional justification, not of doxastic 
justification. Begin to consider the following rather intuitive principle connecting 




(JPD)  If S’s belief that P based on mental state M is doxastically justified to a 
certain degree, then, in virtue of being in M, S has the same degree of 
propositional justification for believing P.  
 
This principle says that the epistemic basis of a doxastically justified belief can only 
be a mental state in virtue of which a subject has propositional justification. For 
instance, imagine Frank who justifiedly believes that it is snowing outside. If this is 
so, Frank must have based his belief on a mental state that gives him justification 
for believing that it is snowing. For instance, Frank must have formed the belief as 
a response to his having an experience as of snow falling on the ground, or to his 
hearing someone saying that it was snowing outside. Had Frank based his belief 
on a different mental state unsuited to give him propositional justification for 
believing that it is snowing––for instance, his imagining snow falling on the ground–
–his belief that it is snowing would not have been doxastically justified to start with.  
Consider now that an upholder of EJ is committed to saying that if S has a 
certain degree of propositional justification for believing P, S has evidence E that 
supports P to that degree. An evidentialist that accepts EJ is hence committed to 
the following rewriting of (JPD): 
 
(JPD*)  If S’s belief that P based on mental state M is doxastically justified to a 
certain degree, then, in virtue of being in M, S has evidence E supporting P 
to the same degree. 
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It is important to note that (JPD*)’s consequent is ambiguous between two different 
readings, which depend on what answer one gives to the question (Q2) asking 
what constitutes evidence. So I now turn to these answers, and clarify how one 
who accepts these answers should read the consequent of (JPD*).  
The first answer––known as Psychologism––says that S’s evidence is 
constituted by mental states of S. Different versions of this answer diverge over 
which mental state of S, in particular, should be taken to be elements of S’s 
evidence. A first distinction is between those who require that a mental state have 
a mind-to-world direction of fit in order to be an element of S’s evidence, and those 
that do not. The first theorists (e.g. McCain 2014) typically mention as elements of 
S’s evidence S’s beliefs, S’s apparent perceptions, S’s memories etc. The second 
theorists are more liberal, and also count as elements of S’s evidence different 
psychological items, such as S’s feelings and S’s sensations (for instance Conee 
and Feldman 2011). A second distinction, internal to those who require a mind-to-
world direction of fit, is between those who count as elements of S’s evidence 
factive mental states––such as S’s seeing that P, or S’s remembering that P––as 
well as non-factive mental states––like S’s perceptual or memorial seemings––and 
those who contend that S’s evidence consists solely of non-factive mental states 
(Pritchard 2012 is a representative of the first category, and McCain 2014 a 
representative of the second).  
The second answer––known as Propositionalism––says that S’s evidence 
is constituted by propositions. An important distinction within the Propositionalist 
camp depends on whether it is contended that a proposition must be true in order 
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to be an element of one’s evidence. Factive propositionalists (like Williamson 2000, 
and Littlejohn 2012) contend that only true propositions can be elements of S’s 
evidence. Non-factive propositionalists (like Comesaña & McGrath 2014, and 
Rizzieri 2011) admit as elements of S’s evidence both true and false propositions.  
As emphasized by McCain (2014: 11), Psychologists and Propositionalists 
tend to agree that S’s mental states uniquely determine what evidence is 
possessed by S. This is straightforward in the case of Psychologism, as the 
Psychologists identify S’s evidence with (a specific subset, varying from one theory 
to another) of S’s mental states. The Propositionalists however typically contend 
that S possesses E as evidence to the extent to which S is in some mental state 
having E as content. Most typically, when it is the content of a mental state, like a 
belief, having a mind-to-world direction of fit. So, also for a Propositionalist S’s 
evidence is determined by which mental states S is in.  
This being so, we must not forget that these two answers mandate two 
different readings of (JPD*)’s consequent. If one endorses a Psychologistic theory 
of evidence, in particular, one is committed to reading this principle in the following 
way: 
 
(JPDPS) If S’s belief that P based on mental state M is doxastically justified to 
a certain degree, M is evidence supporting P to the same degree. 
 
If, on the other hand, one endorses a Propositionalist theory of evidence one is 
committed to reading this principle in the following way: 
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(JPDPR) If S’s belief that P based on mental state M is doxastically justified to 
a certain degree, M has as content a proposition supporting P to the 
same degree.  
 
(JPDPS) and (JPDPR) can be tested against examples. Suppose in fact that it is 
very intuitive that S’s belief that P based on M is doxastically justified. (JPDPS) is 
refuted unless M is evidence supporting P. Alternatively, (JPDPR) is refuted unless 
M’s content is evidence supporting P. Before carrying out these tests, however, we 
need to know what does it take for a mental state of M, or for M’s content, to be 
evidence supporting a given proposition. In other words, we need an answer to 
Q1. In what follows, I shall primarily concentrate on the explanationist answer to 
Q1 that has been defended by contemporary Evidentialists like Conee & Feldman, 
and McCain. So, I shall test the adequacy of  (JPDPR) and (JPDPR) against the 
backdrop of their explanationist theory of the support relation. After having carried 
out this task, I shall endeavour to show that the test is bound to give the same 
result against the backdrop of any alternative answer to Q1.  
 Contemporary evidentialists like Conee & Feldman (2008, 2011), and 
McCain (2014, 2015), endorse a Psychologistic ontology of evidence. So they 
have answered Q1 by stating the conditions on which a mental state M of S is 
evidence that a given proposition P is true. Their theory can however be adapted 
to a Propositionalist ontology of evidence, as stating the conditions on which M’s 
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propositional content is evidence that P is true. According to McCain (2014)’s more 
recent and refined formulation: 
 
(EXPS) M is evidence for S that P is true if and only if (i) P is part of the best 
explanation available to S of why S has M, or (ii) P is available to S 
as a  consequence of the best explanation available to S of why S 
has M.   
 
The Propositionalist variant of the latter explanationist principle says: 
 
(EXPR) Proposition E is evidence for S that P is true if and only if (i) P is part 
of the best explanation available to S of the truth of E, or (ii) P is 
available to S as a consequence of the best explanation available to 
S of the truth of E.   
 
It should be noted that, for any mental state M of S, on (EXPS) M is evidence for S 
that P is true if and only if on (EXPR) the proposition that S has M is evidence that 
P is true. For instance, let M be Agatha’s memory that she had cereals for 
breakfast. Suppose Agatha is suffering amnesia, and that she is being treated to 
reactivate her memory. On this background, the best explanation available to 
Agatha of why she now seems to remember that she had cereals for breakfast is 
that (P) her therapy is starting to work. Hence on (EXPS) Agatha’s memory M 
counts as evidence for the proposition (P) that the therapy is starting to work. By 
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the same token, the proposition (EM) that Agatha now seems to remember that she 
ate cereals for breakfast is on (EXPS) evidence that P is true. For P is part of the 
best explanation available to Agatha of the truth of EM.  
That a mental state M counts on (EXPS) as evidence that P is true if and only 
if the proposition that S has M counts on (EXPR) as evidence that P is true might 
easily invite the thought that the choice between a Psychologistic or a 
Propositionalist ontology of evidence does not really make a difference with 
respect to the conditions on which principles like EJ and JPD predict that S 
possesses, respectively, propositional and doxastic justification. But this would be 
a mistake.  
Suppose in fact that S has M but, not having reflected on this fact, she does 
not introspectively believe that she has M. Suppose further that S’s background is 
such that P is part of the best explanation available to S as to why S has M. In a 
similar situation (EXPS) says that M is evidence that P is true, and (EXPR) says that 
the proposition that S has M is evidence that P is true. But S can be granted the 
possession of evidence that P is true only if one adopts a psychologist ontology of 
evidence. For since S did not form the introspective belief that she has M, S cannot 
be granted the possession of the proposition that she has M as evidence that P is 
true. Hence, EJ predicts that S has propositional justification for believing P only if 
this principle is read in light of a Psychologist ontology of evidence. Suppose 
further that S forms the belief that P on the basis of M, and suppose that this belief 
is doxastically justified. In accordance with JPD*, this fact can be explained only if 
in virtue of being in M S has evidence that P is true. More in particular, if one adopts 
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a Psychologistic ontology of evidence, this can be explained only if M is evidence 
that P is true; and if one adopts a Propositionalist ontology of evidence this can be 
explained only if M’s content is evidence that P is true. So, also in this case the 
relevant epistemic phenomena can only be accommodated if one adopts a 
Psychologistic ontology of evidence. For on a Propositionalist ontology of 
evidence, it is the proposition that S has M, and not M’s content itself, that is 
evidence that P is true.  
To find good examples of how this might happen, we just have to look for 
ordinary cases in which a subject is intuitively justified in believing that P simply in 
virtue of the fact that S has the seeming or the apparent perception that P1. Take 
for instance Laura, who looks out of the window and has the seeming that (TREES) 
the trees in the garden are moved by the wind. Call Laura’s perceptual seeming 
(STREES). As it happens all of the times, Laura doesn’t pause to reflect on the fact 
that she has this seeming, but as a spontaneous response to her having it she 
directly transitions to believing TREES. It is intuitive that Laura’s belief in TREES 
is doxastically justified. This epistemic fact can be accommodated by JPD* only if 
in virtue of having STREES Laura has propositional justification for believing TREES. 
If one adopts a Psychologistic ontology of evidence, this demand is easily satisfied. 
For is Laura has just ordinary background information, the truth of TREES is part 
of the best explanation available to her of why she has STREES. Hence, on EXPS, 
 
1  For the purposes of this paper, I endorse the view according to which the perceptual 
seeming that P is a non-factive propositional attitude, having P as its content, 
characterized by the distinctive phenomenal character of perceptually disclosing to 
one the truth of P. Many philosophers have struggled to describe what it is like to 
have the perceptual seeming that P by resorting to different metaphors. See for 
instance Pryor (2000), Huemer (2013), Tucker (2013). 
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STRESS is evidence for Laura that P is true, and the consequent of JPDPS is satisfied. 
On the other hand, if one adopts a Propositionalist ontology of evidence, the 
intuition that Laura is doxastically justified is jeopardized. In order to explain the 
intuitive fact that Laura is doxastically justified in believing TREES, JPDPR requires 
that in virtue of having STRESS Laura has evidence that TREES is true. But this is 
not the case. On EXPR the proposition that Laura has STREES is evidence for her 
that P is true, but this is not evidence that Laura can be taken to possess in virtue 
of the fact that she has STRESS. In order to possess this evidence, Laura should 
introspectively believe that she has STRESS. But by the definition of the case, Laura 
doesn’t form the introspective belief that she has STRESS, and so a fortiori she 
doesn’t form the belief that TREE on the basis of this belief. Hence, the consequent 
of JPDPS is not satisfied.2  
 
2  Of course Laura has STREES, and in virtue of having this mental state Laura represents 
TREES as true. So, it might be suggested, in virtue of having this mental state Laura 
bears to the proposition that TREES the relation that S must bear to a proposition E if 
E is to be part of S’s evidence. Hence, in virtue of having STREES Laura has TREES 
available as part of her evidence (this suggestion is adumbrated in Dougherty 2011.) 
Notice, however, that on EXPS TREES is not evidence that TREES is true. For the truth 
of the proposition that TREES is not available to Laura as part of the best explanation 
of the truth of TREES itself! The suggestion that Laura’s belief in TREES is justified on 
the basis of evidence coinciding with TREES is not only problematic on EXPS. As many 
epistemologists have contended, there is something inappropriate in the attempt to 
explain S’s justification for believing a proposition P in terms of the possession as 
evidence of the very proposition that P. If S’s sole piece of evidence bearing to P were 
P itself, in fact, S’s epistemic situation would exhibit a vicious circularity that would be 
unable to generate the justification for believing P with which it is intuitive to credit S for 
the sole reason that it seems to her that P. For a clear statement of this complaint see 
Turri (2009: 497-8) and McCain (2014: 19). A related complaint, voiced by Glüer (2009: 
305), is that the model at issue commits one to describing the formation of the belief 
that P on the basis of the seeming that P as the (stuttering) process whereby one 
indefeasibly infers P from the premise that P. Since perceptual beliefs are not risk-free, 
this indicates that the proposition that P cannot be the evidence on the basis of which 
S believes that P.       
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It must be added, in the opposite direction, that certain cases intuitively 
involving doxastically justified beliefs can only be accommodated by JPDPR, and 
not by JPDPS. So, these cases can just be accommodated if one endorses a 
Propositionalist ontology of evidence, and not if one endorses a Psychologist 
ontology of evidence. In these cases, it is intuitive that S justifiedly believes P on 
the basis of a given mental state M, yet P is part of the best explanation not of 
why S has M, but of why M’s content is true. Consider the following example, in 
which M coincides not with a perceptual seeming but with a justified belief of S. 
Suppose Rebecca forms the justified belief (B1) that a window in her apartment 
has been broken, and the justified belief (B2) that her safe has apparently been 
forced open while many of the valuables it contained disappeared. Rebecca 
competently infers from B1 and B2 the belief that (BREAK-IN) a burglar broke into 
her apartment. It is intuitive that Rebecca’s belief that BREAK-IN is doxastically 
justified. This epistemic fact can be successfully accommodated only if in virtue 
of B1 and B2 Rebecca can be taken to have evidence that BREAK-IN is true. If 
one endorses a Psychologist ontology of evidence, in particular, this demand is 
satisfied only if, on (EXPS), B1 and B2 are evidence for Rebecca that BREAK-IN is 
true. However, on (EXPS), B1 and B2 are not evidence for Rebecca that P is true. 
What explains the fact that she has B1 is arguably Rebecca’s perceptual 
seemings as of a broken window, and what explains that she has B2 is arguably 
Rebecca’s perceptual seemings as of her safe open together with her awareness 
of being unable to locate the valuables that she remembers the safe contained. If 
one endorses a Propositionalist ontology of evidence, the demand that in virtue 
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of having B1 and B2 Rebecca has evidence that BREAK-IN is true is satisfied 
only if, on (EXPR), the content of B1 and B2 is evidence for Rebecca that BREAK-
IN is true. And, as it is easy to check, this demand is satisfied; for on (EXPR), the 
content of B1 and B2 is evidence for Rebecca that P is true. In fact the truth of P–
–that a burglar broke into her apartment––is part of the best explanation 
available to Rebecca of why the content of B1 and B2 is true––namely of why the 
window of her apartment is broken, and the safe has been forced open while 
many valuables are missing.  
What this shows is that the Evidentialist who endorses an explanationist 
answer to Q2 is faced with a dilemma. If she accepts a Propositionalist ontology 
of evidence, and so in particular accepts (EXPR), the Evidentialist accounts in a 
natural way for ordinary cases of inferential justification, but then she is unable to 
account for ordinary cases of perceptual justification. If she accepts a 
Psychologist ontology of evidence, and so in particular accepts (EXPS), the 
Evidentialist accounts in a natural way for ordinary cases of perceptual 
justification, but she is unable to account for ordinary cases of inferential 
justification. The moral that the above considerations illustrate does not seem to 
be relative to just the explanationist principles (EXPR) and (EXPS). Rather, the 
dilemma between a Psychologist and a Propositionalist ontology of evidence 
illustrated above seems bound to re-emerge for whatever relation R one 
mentions in the attempt to answer Q1 in principled terms. Suppose, for any R, 





(#PS)   M is evidence for S that P is true if and only if the existence of M 




(#PR)   Proposition E is evidence for S that P is true if and only if the truth of 
E  bears R to P.   
 
Suppose M is S’s seeming that P, and it is intuitive that S, as a spontaneous 
response to her simply having the seeming, forms the doxastically justified belief 
that P. In order to accommodate the intuition that S’s belief that P is doxastically 
justified, JPD* requires that in virtue of having M, S has evidence that P is true. 
Now suppose that (#PS) successfully accommodates this intuition, as the 
existence of M bears R to P. In this case, the relevant intuition is bound to remain 
unaccounted by (#PR). For even if on (#PR) the proposition reporting the existence 
of M is evidence that P is true, this is not evidence that S can be taken to 
possess in virtue of having M. In the opposite direction, suppose M coincides 
with S’s justified belief that E, and that S competently infers P from E. Suppose it 
is intuitive that S thereby forms the doxastically justified belief that P. Suppose 
further that E, but not the proposition that S has M, bears R to P. In this case, the 
relevant intuition is accounted by (#PR). On (#PR) E is evidence that P is true. So 
the consequent of JPDPR, which requires that the content of S’s belief be 
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evidence that P is true, is satisfied. The relevant intuition, on the other hand, is 
bound to stay unaccounted if one accepts (#PS). By the definition of the case it is 
the truth of M’s content E, and not the existence of M, that bears R to P. So on 
(#PS) M is not evidence that P is true, and so the consequent of JPDPS is 
unfulfilled.   
 
§2 What Constitutes Evidence? A Propositionalist Answer 
It is a result of the preceding section that the Evidentialist who is faced with the 
choice between a Propositionalist and a Psychologist ontology of evidence cannot 
hope to successfully accommodate intuitive cases of perceptual and inferential 
justification at once. If she endorses a Psychologist ontology of evidence, her 
theory is naturally suited to explain intuitive cases of perceptual (doxastic) 
justification, but at the cost of being unable to explain intuitive cases of inferential 
(doxastic) justification. Conversely, if she endorses a Propositionalist ontology of 
evidence, her theory is naturally suited to explain intuitive cases of inferential 
(doxastic) justification, but at the cost of being unable to explain intuitive cases of 
perceptual (doxastic) justification. Either way, the Evidentialist can at best aspire 
to deliver a partial account of the relevant epistemic phenomena. In this section I 
address question Q2. I will start by rehearsing the dialectic between the 
Psychologists and the Propositionalist, and end the section by supplying a new 
argument in favour of Propositionalism. By so doing, my fundamental aim is to 
show that Evidentialism is unable to accommodate on its own terms intuitive cases 
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of doxastic perceptual justification, and so to motivate the claim that perceptual 
justification must be accounted for in non-evidentialist terms.  
In response to Q2, Conee and Feldman endorse a Psychologistic answer, 
saying in particular that S’s evidence is constituted by S's non-factive mental states 
(2004: 2, 76, 84, 112; 2008: 84, 87, 91, 96). This answer to Q2 has not stayed 
unchallenged. In particular, it has been challenged in light of very plausible 
arguments––put forward by T. Williamson (2000: 194-97)––for the conclusion that 
a subject S's evidence could just be constituted by propositions. These arguments 
exhibit a common feature: they all isolate certain roles that evidence is supposed 
to play, and conclude that evidence is constituted by propositions from the premise 
that just propositions could play these roles3. In what follows I shall concentrate 
my attention to the first of Williamson’s arguments. The similarity with Williamson’s 
second and third argument makes the discussion about the first argument easy to 
apply to those arguments.    
The first argument proposed by Williamson is premised on the claim that (1) 
a subject S's evidence is the kind of thing that hypotheses explain, and on the 
claim that (2) the kind of thing that hypotheses explain are propositions, and 
concludes (3) that S's evidence consists of propositions. In response, Conee and 
Feldman have maintained that also S's mental states, in some plausible sense, 
are explained by hypotheses. Here is the relevant passage, where Conee and 
 
3 Sometimes Williamson presents these arguments as aimed to show that evidence is 
propositional, rather than constituted by propositions. However, as he clarifies 
explicitly, by 'propositional' he means 'constitued by propositions'. For instance he 
writes that 'one's evidence is propositional if and only if it is a set of propositions' 
(2000: 194).  
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Feldman critically address Williamson's claim that hypotheses just explain 
propositions: 
 
We will use another example from Tim Williamson … that of explaining World War I.  
… The occurrence of the one huge event, WWI, that is the combination of all of 
these things, can be explained by giving an argument the conclusion of which read 
‘and so WWI occurred’. The last two words do express the proposition that WWI 
occurred. That proposition is the conclusion of the explanatory reasoning. What is 
explained, though, is not the proposition, but the occurrence of the war that the 
proposition asserts to have occurred (2011: 322) 
 
In Conee and Feldman's opinion, explanatory arguments do not explain 
propositions, but the events that these propositions report as occurring. So, an 
explanatory argument featuring as its conclusion a proposition reporting the 
occurrence of WWI does not explain this proposition, but WWI itself, the event the 
proposition reports as having occurred. In the same way, against (2), a hypothesis 
H explaining why mental state M occurs in S's mind does not explain the 
proposition reporting the occurrence of M, but M's occurrence itself.  
The most urgent question raised by Conee and Feldman’s reply is about 
whether an explanation should be taken to explain an event or the truth of the 
proposition reporting it. In what follows I shall address this question by rehearsing 
an argument put forward by C. Littlejohn (2012) for the claim that explanations do 
not feature events as explanans, and by defending it from the charge, recently 
levelled against it by K. McCain (2014), of being unsound. Then I shall discuss 
some complications having to do with criteria for event identity, and finally present 
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a novel argument for the claim that explanations do not feature events as 
explananda.  
 Here is Littlejohn’s argument. Coop drinks a wine, and the wine causes 
Coop to vomit. The wine is in fact poisoned, and is a Burgundy. Coop's drinking 
the wine, Coop's drinking the poison, and Coop's drinking the Burgundy are 
therefore one and the same event. Hence, each event causes Coop to vomit. 
However, only the event of Coop's drinking a poisonous wine explains why Coop 
vomits. Hence events do not figure in arguments as explanans. Quite recently, K. 
McCain (2014: 16-7) has argued that Littlejohn's argument is unsound. According 
to McCain, the argument must be reconstructed as follows: 
 
1. Coop’s drinking the poison and his drinking a Burgundy are the same event.  
2. Coop’s drinking the poison caused him to vomit.  
3. If (1) and (2), then Coop’s drinking a Burgundy caused him to vomit.  
4. Coop’s drinking a Burgundy caused him to vomit. (from 1, 2, 3)  
5. If events figure in explanations as explanans/explananda, then, for all events 
A and B, if event A caused event B, then event A explains event B.  
6. Coop’s drinking a Burgundy does not explain his vomiting.  
7. Events do not figure in explanations as explanans/explananada. (from 4, 5, 6)  
 
McCain does not question premise 1. According to him, the argument is unsound 
because premise 5 and premise 6 cannot be true together. Premise 5––he 
suggests––is true only if “explains” is read as “is part of an explanation”. To 
illustrate the point, McCain mentions the presence of oxygen in the environment. 
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According to him, the presence of the oxygen is a cause of the house burning 
down. However the house burning down is not fully explained by the presence of 
the oxygen in the environment. The latter condition is at best an element of the 
explanation of why this has happened. When “explains” is read as “is part of an 
explanation”, however, premise 6 turns out false. Although it does not fully explain 
why Coop vomits––McCain suggests––Coop’s drinking a Burgundy is at least part 
of the explanation of why Coop vomits.   
McCain’s assessment of Littlejohn’s argument is unconvincing. McCain is 
not explicit about what he means by “part of an explanation”. What he says, 
however, suggests that he takes at least three conditions to be sufficient for A’s 
being part of the explanation of B.  
As seen above, McCain argues that the presence of oxygen is part of an 
explanation of why the house burned down. Since the presence of oxygen is 
necessary but not also sufficient for the house burning down, this suggests that, 
for McCain: 
 
PE1 A is part of the explanation of B when A is necessary but is not also sufficient 
for B.  
 
The condition specified by PE1’s antecedent seems sufficient for A’s being in some 
plausible sense part of the explanation of B. However, PE1 is unsuitable for the 
purpose to show that premise 6, with “explains” read as “is part of an explanation”, 
is false. For Coop’s drinking a Burgundy is not necessary for Coop’s vomiting. 
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Hence, at least as far as PE1 goes, premise 6 can still be true even when “explains” 
is read as in 5 as meaning “is part of an explanation”.  
 While arguing that, properly interpreted, 6 is false McCain also mentions 
that Coop’s drinking a Burgundy increases the probability of Coop’s vomiting. 
Moreover, he correctly observes that the way in which Coop’s situation is described 
suggests that Coop would not have vomited if he had not drunk the Burgundy. This 
suggests that for McCain it is also true that: 
 
PE2 A is part of the explanation of B when A increases B’s probability.  
PE3 A is part of the explanation of B when A would not have been the case had 
B not been the case. 
 
PE2 and PE3 fare better than PE1 with respect to the task of showing that, in some 
sense, Coop’s drinking the Burgundy is part of the explanation of Coop’s vomiting. 
For the conditions specified by their antecedents seem to be satisfied in Coop’s 
case. The probability that Coop vomits given that Coop drank a Burgundy seems 
to exceed the probability that Coop vomits given whatever else we are told by 
Littlejohn about Coop’s situation. Moreover, nothing in the way this situation is 
described suggests that Coop would have vomited also if he had refrained from 
drinking the (poisoned) Burgundy.  The problem is however that PE2 and PE3 are 
both false: their antecedents can be satisfied when A is not even part of an 
explanation of why B is the case. 
22 
 Let A be Lee Harvey Oswald shooting JKF three times at 12:30 p.m. on 
Friday, November 22, 1963, and let B be JFK’s being fatally shot at 12:30 p.m. on 
Friday, November 22, 1963. For the argument’s sake, suppose that none of 
Oswald’s gunshots has hit JKF and that the fatal gunshot has been fired by a 
second sniper, who has remained unknown. Also suppose that Oswald and the 
second sniper had agreed to act in tandem: no one would have fired if the other 
had not fired in turn. Intuitively, A is not part of the explanation of B. None of 
Oswald’s doings explains why JFK has been fatally shot at 12:30 p.m. on Friday, 
November 22, 1963. However PE2 and PE3 are both satisfied. On the one hand, 
Oswald shooting JFK three times at 12:30 p.m. on Friday, November 22, 1963 
dramatically increased the probability that, by that time, JFK should be fatally shot. 
Moreover, if Oswald had not fired, the second sniper would have refrained from 
firing, and JFK would not have been fatally shot.  
 McCain does not seem to have succeeded to show that, on some 
admissible notion of “being part of an explanation”, Coop’s drinking a Burgundy is 
part of the explanation of why Coop vomited. So, no matter how we read premise 
5 in Littlejohn’s original argument, premise 6 has not been successfully shown to 
be false.  
 A different line of attack that McCain could have pursued targets premise 1, 
according to which Coop’s drinking the Burgundy is the same event as Coop’s 
drinking the poison. If one event isn’t identical with the other, Coop’s drinking the 
Burgundy need not be the cause of Coop’s vomiting; and if Coop’s drinking the 
Burgundy is not the cause of Coop’s vomiting, premises 5 and 6 no longer entail 
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that events do not figure in explanations as explanans/explananda. So is premise 
1 true? This depends on how coarse grained a criterion of event identity one 
adopts. Along with one rather popular criterion, associated to Quine and Davidson, 
event A1 and event A2 are one and the same event if and only if they occupy the 
same space-time region. On the Quine-Davidson criterion, Coop’s drinking the 
poison and Coop’s drinking the wine count as one and the same event. So, at least 
if one adopts this criterion, premise 1 is safe. But as is well known, the Quine-
Davidson criterion has not stayed unchallenged and has been criticised in light of 
examples adduced by Davidson himself (1980: 178).4 According to a different 
proposal, due to J. Kim (1993), events are instantiations of properties by objects. 
On such a conception, an event A1 of the form <the instantiation by x of property 
P at t> and an event A2 of the form <the instantiation by y of property Q at t’> are 
one and the same event if and only if x = y, P = Q, and t = t’. On Kim’s criterion, 
differently than on the Quine-Davidson criterion, premise 1 of Littlejohn’s argument 
turns out false. The property of drinking the poison and the property of drinking the 
Burgundy are distinct properties. So, although they are instantiated by the same 
object (Coop) at the same time, they are constituents of different events. Also Kim’s 
criterion, however, has not stayed immune from criticism. One recurrent objection 
is that it is too discriminating: it counts as being distinct events that, intuitively, are 
one and the same event.5  
 
4  In one such example, a ball rotates through 35 degrees and, at the very same time, it 
warms up. Plausibly, these are separate events but they occupy the same space-time 
region. 
5 To many, for instance, Brutus’ stabbing Caesar seem to be the very same event as 
the event of Brutus killing Caesar. However, the relational property of stabbing 
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It is fair to say that which criterion should be adopted is a very controversial 
issue in contemporary philosophy. Since addressing this question exceeds the 
scope of this paper, in what follows I shall try to strengthen Littlejohn’s case for 
Propositionalism by giving an argument which is premised–– rather than potentially 
rebutted on the basis of––Kim’s criterion of event identity. This argument directly 
aims to establish the conclusion that just propositions, and not events, figure in 
explanations as explananda.  
A soldier, at the marketplace, sees the death making (what he takes to be) 
a menacing gesture towards him. Frightened, he flees to Samarkand, which he 
believes not to be the place where he has a rendez-vous with the death. But 
Samarkand, unbeknownst to him, is the place where he has a rendez-vous with 
the death; and the death’s gesture was just a way of expressing surprise for 
seeing the soldier far away from the place in which she knew they had a rendez-
vous. It might seem intuitive that the soldier’s desire not to die, together with his 
belief that Samarkand is not the place where he had a rendez-vous with the 
death (call the latter pair DB), fully explains an event: (e1) his going to 
Samarkand. But this cannot be so. Begin to note that ‘Samarkand’ and ‘the place 
where the soldier has a rendez-vous with the death’ refer to one and the same 
place. Hence, by Kim’s criterion of event identity, (e1) is identical with (e2) the 
soldier going to the place where he has a rendez-vous with the death6. Now 
consider the following very plausible principle about explanation.  
 
someone is different than the property of killing someone. So these events are distinct 
on Kim’s criterion. 
6   An anonymous referee has observed that whether on Kim’s criterion e1 and e2 




(EX-ID) For all X, Y and Z if X is sufficient to explain Y, and Y = Z, X is 
sufficient to explain Z. 
 
(EX-ID) is very general, as its plausibility does not depend on any specific 
theory of the metaphysical nature of X, Y and Z. (EX-ID) just commits to saying 
that explanatory sufficiency, whatever else its relata are taken to be, is closed 
under identity: if Y and Z are identical, it cannot be that X is sufficient to explain Y 
and that it is not sufficient to explain Z. Now take up again the initially intuitive claim 
that DB fully explains (e1). Since (e1) and (e2) are one and the same event, it 
follows by (EX-ID) that DB cannot be sufficient to explain (e1) without at the same 
being sufficient to explain (e2). But DB is sufficient to explain (e2): the soldier’s 
desire not to die and his belief that Samarkand is not the place were he had a 
rendez-vous, by themselves, are not sufficient to explain why the soldier goes to 
the place where he has a rendez-vous with the death! Hence, DB does not fully 
explain (e1) either. Importantly, from this it does not also follow that DB does not 
explain why the soldier went to Samarkand. The more limited moral illustrated by 
 
where the soldier has a rendez-vous with the death” signify the same property. The latter 
question is not settled by Kim’s criterion and has sparked intense discussion. While Kim 
himself (1969: 202) has explicitly committed himself to regarding events like e1 and e2 
as the same event, Bennett (1988: 82-87) has maintained that Kim’s criterion, once 
paired with the claim that events like e1 and e2 are the same event, engenders 
inconsistent consequences. Fortunately, I think that for the purpose of the present paper 
we can avoid delving into this complex debate by disconnecting the question whether on 
Kim’s approach e1 and e2 are the same event from the question about whether  “going 
to Samarkand” and “going where the soldier has a rendez-vous with the death” express 
the same property. This, I believe, can be done by simply assuming that e1 and e2 are 
the same event because they are instantiations by the same entities, namely the soldier 
and Samarkand, of the same property, namely the property expressed by the dyadic 
predicate “going to”. 
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the argument above is that DB does not explain an event––(e1)––but a 
proposition––the proposition that reports the occurrence of (e1). This conclusion 
is not inconsistent with the demands of (EX-ID): the proposition reporting (e1) 
differs from the proposition reporting (e2). So, DB’s inability to explain why the 
soldiers went to the place where he had a rendez-vous with the death is entirely 
consistent with the fact that DB fully explains why the soldier went to Samarkand. 
 
§3 Weak Non-Evidentialism About Perceptual Justification  
In accordance with the conclusion of section 1, the Evidentialist is faced with a 
dilemma. If she endorses a Psychologist ontology of evidence, she’s unable to 
accommodate intuitive cases involving inferential (doxastic) justification––cases 
in which a subject intuitively forms a justified belief that Q by inferring it from a 
different belief. If she endorses a Propositionalist ontology of evidence, she is 
unable to accommodate intuitive cases involving perceptual (doxastic) 
justification. To the extent to which the Evidentialist must occupy one horn of this 
dilemma, this shows that there is no way to fill in the details of the evidentialist 
position––in particular no way to answer Q2––which is able to vindicate it. 
According to the conclusion of the last section, the Evidentialist has reasons to 
occupy the Propositionalist horn of the dilemma. This shows that the evidentialist 
has reasons to answer Q2 in a way that renders her position unable to 
accommodate intuitive cases of doxastic perceptual justification.   
As anticipated at the end of the introductory section, I take the latter 
conclusion to motivate a weak form of Non-Evidentialism. Weak Non-
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Evidentialism differs from stronger versions of Non-Evidentialism because it is 
compatible with the following principle: 
 
Justifier Principle (JP) 
If S’s doxastic attitude D toward proposition P is epistemically justified for 
S at t, there is some justifier J in virtue of which D is epistemically justified 
for S at t. 
 
To uphold Strong Non-Evidentialism one must deny JP. Doxastic Conservatism 
and Wright (2004)’s Entitlement theory are versions of Strong Non-Evidentialism 
precisely because they are inconsistent with this principle. The former view says, 
roughly, that a subject’s belief may be justified for the sole fact that it exists. So, 
acceptance of Doxastic Conservatism clearly commits to the possible existence 
of justified beliefs that are justified even if there is no justifier which justifies 
them7. The latter view says that a subject’s attitude of trust or acceptance that 
certain general presuppositions of our cognitive projects are satisfied may be 
warranted by default, even in the absence of any cognitive accomplishment on 
the part of the subject.  
 
7  D. Christensen (1994) correctly observes that in certain cases the mere fact that S 
has the belief that P may itself be evidence for S that P is true. Suppose S believes P, 
and that S, even if she has no evidence for believing that P, justifiedly believes that 
she wouldn’t have formed the belief that P if P had been false. In this case, the very 
existence of S’s belief that P is some evidence for S that P is true. Although the 
doxastic conservative can grant this point, this is not the kind of situation she has in 
mind when she advocates her position. Rather, she means that one’s having a belief 
justifies one in maintaining the belief even if the fact that one has the belief is not in 
itself evidence that the belief is true.   
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 To be a Weak Non-Evidentialist one has just to deny the weaker left-to-
right conditional embedded within EJ, saying: 
 
EJL-R 
If S’s doxastic attitude D toward proposition P is epistemically justified for 
S at t, having D toward P fits the evidence that S has at t.8 
 
The form of Weak Non-Evidentialism motivated in this paper, in particular, 
maintains that EJL-R is falsified by S’s perceptual belief, whose justificatory status 
cannot be accommodate in evidentialist terms.  This Weak Non-Evidentialism 
can be externalist or internalist, depending on the nature of the non-evidential 
justifiers it countenances for our perceptual beliefs. It is externalist if these non-
evidential justifiers are not introspectively accessible or if they are non-mental. 
 
8 It is important to note that EJL-R is weaker that JP only if the notion of a justifier of P is 
more general than the notion of evidence which is central to EJL-R. In other words, only if 
something can be regarded as a justifier without, at the same time, being properly 
regarded as (something in virtue of which one has) evidence, namely as an evidential 
justifier. This is not obvious. C. Wright, for instance, presupposes a very broad notion of 
evidence––one “encompassing both a priori and empirical considerations for the truth of 
the warranted proposition” (2004: 175)––when he characterizes his notion of entitlement 
as a non-evidential type of warrant. So it is not obvious, from Wright’s perspective, that 
JP is logically stronger than EJL-R. Much to the contrary, it seems that for Wright the label 
“justifier” and “evidential justifier” come to one and the same thing. Note, however, that 
Wright’s reading is not the reading of EJL-R that a considered Evidentialist ought to 
endorse. Principles like EJ and JPD* are proposed as analyses or explanations of 
epistemic notions such as propositional and doxastic justification. So, they cannot rest 
on a notion of evidence simply meant to be equivalent to the notion of a justifier. As aptly 
noted by A. Goldman, in fact, “if ‘evidence’ is defined as ‘that which justifies belief’, then 
the definition of ‘justified’ in terms of ‘evidence’, as proposed in EJ, is circular and 
unhelpful” (2011: 255). So, at least in the context of the present discussion, we can 
assume that EJL-R and JP are not equivalent principles, and that there is conceptual 
room for the weakly Non-Evidentialist position of one who accepts the latter principle 




On the other hand, it is internalist if these non-evidential justifiers are 
introspectively accessible or if they are mental.  
The position advocated by J. Lyons (2016) is an example of an externalist 
weakly Non-Evidentialist position. On the one hand, Lyons accepts the claim that 
S’s beliefs may justify other beliefs of S by serving as evidence for those beliefs. 
Lyons also accepts that the justificatory status of S’s perceptual beliefs requires a 
substantial explanation in terms of justifiers. However, he denies that S’s 
perceptual experiences justify S’s perceptual beliefs in the specific way of serving 
as evidence for those beliefs. Rather, he defends that view that S’s perceptual 
beliefs are justified––when they are––in virtue of the fact that they are reliably 
produced by a perceptual module. The Non-Evidentialist component of Lyons’ 
theory is of a distinctively externalist character. For whether or not the relevant 
belief has been reliably produced by a perceptual module is not something that 
one can ascertain simply of the basis of introspection, neither is it a feature of 
one’s mental life. So Lyons’ variety of weak Non-Evidentialism is externalist. 
Since Evidentialism is primarily proposed as an internalist theory, it might appear 
natural to think that this is exactly how Weak Non-Evidentialism should be. In 
other words, it might appear natural to conceive of the category of non-evidential 
justifiers and of externalist justifiers as entirely overlapping. But this, as we have 
seen, is a mistake. The Evidentialist is committed to providing a detailed 
explanation of what she means by “evidence”. So it obviously constitutes a 
possibility that a justifier which is internal in either the sense of being 
introspectively accessible, or in the sense of being a feature of one’s mental life, 
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still fail to qualify in the relevant sense as (providing one with) evidence. So 
Internalist Weak Non-Evidentialism clearly constitutes a possibility. In the 
reminder of this section I wish to substantiate the suggestion that M. Huemer’s 
Phenomenal Conservatism (Huemer 2001, and 2007), and J. Pryor’s Dogmatism 
(Pryor 2000) can be regarded as examples of a similar view.  In particular, I wish 
to suggest that on these views S’s perceptual seemings count as internalist 
justifiers even if they don’t justify S’s perceptual beliefs by providing evidence. 
According to the former, more general, view, if it seems to S that P is true 
S thereby acquires some degree of prima facie justification for believing P. As we 
have already seen, according to most theorists when S has a seeming that P S 
has a certain sort of experience, essentially characterized by felt veridicality, 
which has propositional content P but cannot be analysed in terms of belief. 
When one has a seeming that P one has the feel of having a mental state whose 
propositional content reveals how things really are (cf. Tucker 2013: §1.1). 
Experiences constituting seemings include memorial seemings––it seeming to 
one to have had eggs for breakfast––, intellectual seemings––it seeming to one 
that 2 plus 2 equals 4––, and perceptual seemings––it seeming to one as if there 
are two hands before one’s nose. Pryor’s Dogmatism concentrates on the 
justificatory power of S’s perceptual seemings, and is the view that “when it 
perceptually seems to you as if p is the case, you have a kind of justification for 
believing p that does not presuppose or rest on your justification for anything 
else” (2000: 519). Both Huemer’s Phenomenal Conservatism and Pryor’s 
Dogmatism have an internalist character because, roughly, seeming-based 
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justification appears to be determined only by factors that are internal to the 
subject’s cognitive perspective. This is true both in the sense that seemings are 
mental states, and in the sense that seemings can be known to occur on the 
basis of introspection alone. In what follows I shall concentrate on Pryor’s 
Dogmatism only, because it focuses on experiential justification, which is the 
issue discussed within this paper. 
Pryor maintains that when your perceptual seeming that P gives you 
justification for believing that P, 
 
it would be misleading to call these experiences your “evidence” for believing p. 
For saying that your experiences are your “evidence” for a perceptual belief 
suggests that your justification for that perceptual belief depends in part on 
premises about your experience—as if you were introspectively aware of your 
experiences, and your perceptual belief were based in some way on that 
awareness. The dogmatist denies that you need any “evidence” of that sort for 
your perceptual beliefs.  
          (2000: 519) 
 
From what Pryor says, it is not entirely clear what he means by “evidence”. It 
strikes me, however, that the quote above is perfectly made sense of if one 
assumes the claim that I have been arguing for in this paper, according to which 
S’s evidence for P is always constituted by propositions, and according to which 
a proposition E is evidence for a proposition P if and only if E bears some relation 
R to P––like the relation of being at least in part best explained by, exploited by 
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EXPR––such that P can be inferred from E. So, for the limited purpose to show 
that Pryor’s dogmatism can be interpreted as a form of Weak Non-Evidentialism, 
for the reminder of this section I shall read Pryor against the backdrop of the 
propositionalist account of evidence sketched above. To attain this goal, it is not 
necessary to credit Pryor with any specific answer to Q1––the question about 
when a given piece of evidence E supports a proposition P. So, I shall simply 
assume that if E is evidence for P, the relation between E and P is such that P 
can be inferred from P. This is enough to make sense of Pryor’s claim that in 
virtue of becoming aware of the fact that she has the seeming that P, S can 
acquire justification for believing P that is independent of––and additional with 
respect to––the justification for believing P that S has simply in virtue of having 
the seeming that P.  
 
Of course, you can become aware of your experiences, by introspection. And 
your introspective awareness that you have experiences of certain sorts might, 
together with appropriate background beliefs, provide you with additional reason 
to believe p. The dogmatist does not deny that. He allows that you may have 
some justification for believing p that does rest on your introspective awareness 
of your experiences, and on background beliefs.  
          (2000: ibidem) 
 
As seen above, the relation between the proposition that P and the proposition 
that S has the seeming that P is such that, in the presence of the right 
background beliefs, one proposition can be inferred from another. For instance, if 
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S believes that her perceptual faculties are working as they should in a 
cooperative environment, the truth of P is available to her as part of the best 
explanation of why she has the seeming that P. Thus, against similar background 
beliefs P is available to S as the conclusion of an inference to the best 
explanation from the premise that she has the seeming. This means that when S 
becomes aware, and comes introspectively to believe, that she has the seeming 
that P, she acquires the proposition that she has the seeming that P as evidence 
that P is true.  
Pryor’s main point is that the contribution of the seeming that P to the 
justification of S’s possible belief that P is also, and perhaps primarily, not to be 
understood in these terms. It is here that Pryor characterizes the non-evidentialist 
part of his theory.  
 
The dogmatist thinks that the mere having of an experience as of p is enough for 
your perceptual justification for believing p to be in place. You do not, in addition, 
have to be aware of your experiences and appeal to facts about them as 
“evidence” for your perceptual beliefs.  
          (2000: ibidem) 
 
According to Pryor, in virtue of having the seeming that P S is not creditable with 
the possession of evidence that P is true. However, in virtue of having the 
seeming S is creditable with the possession of some degree of propositional 
justification for believing P. Hence for Pryor both EJ and JPD* are violated. There 
are possible epistemic circumstances––those in which it perceptually seems to S 
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that P, and in which S has not become aware of this fact––in which believing P is 
epistemically justified for S, yet believing P is not supported by (it does not fit) S’s 
evidence that P is true. And a belief of S based on a mental state M can be 
doxastically justified––when M is S’s perceptual seeming that P––even if it is 
false that in virtue of being in M S has evidence that P is true.  
 This suggests that Pryor can be coherently read as advocating an 
internalist weakly Non-Evidentialist theory of epistemic justification. In its 
broadest outline, the theory in question construes inferential justification––the 
justification one has for believing a proposition P in virtue of justifiedly believing 
different propositions E1 … En––in evidentialist terms. More specifically, as the 
justification one has for believing P in virtue of having E1 … En available as 
evidence that P is true. The justification that S has for believing P in virtue of non-
doxastic states such as the perceptual seeming that P is accounted for in non-
evidentialist terms, as justification that one does not have in virtue of having 
available evidence that P is true. The justification for believing P that S may have 
in virtue of her introspective belief that it perceptually seems to her that P is true 
is a special case of inferential justification, because S’s introspective belief that S 
has the seeming makes available to S the proposition that S has the seeming as 
evidence for S that P is true. But this justification is not to be conflated with the 
justification that S has simply in virtue of having the seeming.  
 If what precedes is on the right track, Pryor’s dogmatism can be 
interpreted as a Weak form of Non-Evidentialism, namely as a theory which 
advocates a specific conception of evidence and evidential justification, and 
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contends that a specific form of epistemic justification, the one had in virtue of 
having a perceptual seeming that P, is not evidential in this sense. This, as is 
clear, leaves one with the question of how the latter justification is to be 
explained. Evidentialism, interpreted in the way I have suggested, conveys an 
explanation of justification. In particular, it says that when one has evidence E 
that P is true one is justified in believing P because in this case one justifiedly 
believes E, and (one is aware) that P being the conclusion of an inference having 
E as a premise, if E is true P is (at least likely to be) true. To say that S’s 
justification for believing P based on the seeming that P is not evidential in this 
sense is to say that it is not justification that can be explained in the same way. 
So before her position can be taken into account as a viable alternative, it is 
clearly incumbent on the Weak Non-Evidentialist I have been describing to tell an 
alternative story which explains S’s justification for believing P based on the 
seeming that P. In response to this question, many have contended that this 
justification is possessed in virtue of the peculiar way in which the experience 
assertively presents its content, namely with the distinctive phenomenology of 
disclosing to one this content as true (Tolhurst 1998; Pryor 2000, 2004; Huemer 
2001; Bengson 2015). The rough idea is that given this phenomenology, 
epistemic rationality, absent reasons for believing otherwise, cannot permit 
anything different than accepting the content of the seeming as true. After all, 
when one is struck by the feeling of being presented with the truth of P, and one 
has no reasons for believing otherwise, believing P is surely preferable to 
disbelieving P or to treating P and not P on a par and refraining from either 
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believing or disbelieving P. This answer is not universally accepted and is 
certainly beset with problems. To name just one, it is afflicted by the problem of 
cognitive penetration, which is the problem that a badly cognitively penetrated 
seeming, though phenomenologically indistinguishable from a perceptual 
seeming that is not cognitively penetrated (or cognitively penetrated in a bad 
way), does not have the power to justify one in accepting its content as true 
(Markie 2005.)9 So, even granting that cognitively non-penetrated seemings have 
the power to justify one in accepting their content, it must be admitted that their 
phenomenology, which is something they have in common with their cognitively 
penetrated counterparts, cannot exhaust the explanation of why it is so.10  
Whether this explanation can be made to work, and whether it can be 
successfully shielded against this and similar objections is a question that is 
beyond the limited scope of this paper. Here, I have been aiming for a more 
limited target. My main goal, to begin with, has been to motivate Weak Non-
Evidentialism in light of the dilemma explained in the first section of the paper, 
and to offer some new reasons for the claim that Evidentialism is not suited, in 
particular, to account for perceptual justification. Secondly, I have pursued the 
goal of showing that Pryor’s Dogmatism can coherently be interpreted as an 
internalist Weakly Non-Evidentialist position which in particular aims to account in 
 
9 Cases of bad cognitive penetration typically involve penetration by desire or unjustified 
belief. In a widely discussed case of the first kind, a gold prospector has a strong desire 
to find gold. This strong desire makes a yellow nugget perceptually seem gold to the 
prospector. According to many, the gold prospector’s perceptual seeming has not the 
power to justify.   
10 For a clear presentation of on the cognitive penetration objection, see Siegel (2012) 
and  Silins (2016) for an overview on the debate about this objection. 
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non-evidentialist terms for perceptual justification. Suffices, for the moment, to 
have hinted at the beginning of a plausible alternative explanation of why 
perceptual seemings are able to justify. This story can surely be refined, but this 
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